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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an address based on Dean Reveszs 2010 Frankel 
Lecture,1 Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz revisit their 
important and influential book, Retaking Rationality: How 
CostBenefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and 
Our Health.2 In that book, the authors argue that proponents of 
environmental, health, and safety regulation have unwisely 
marginalized themselves by refusing to engage debate over how 
                                                     
 * Joseph M. Field 55 Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Ryan 
Bubb, Sasha Post, Amy Sinden, Rena Steinzor, and Lindsey Trachtenberg for helpful 
comments and discussion. This Commentary relies heavily on research and analysis by 
colleagues at the Center for Progressive Reform. For an overview of the Centers work in 
this area, go to http://www.progressivereform.org/regPolicy.cfm. 
 1. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years 
Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 2. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW 
COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 
(2008). 
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best to conduct economic costbenefit analysis of proposed 
regulations. As a result, the approach to costbenefit analysis 
that has tended to dominate within Washington, D.C. reflects a 
lopsided set of assumptions and arguments, primarily serving 
the interests of regulated industries.3 As Livermore and Revesz 
note in their address, [t]his basic political dynamic, which was 
present at the founding moment of aggressive costbenefit 
analysis-based regulatory review, informed the development of 
costbenefit analysis in the United States for at least three 
decades and continues to exert considerable pull today.4 Thus, 
even as a bipartisan consensus [has been] crystallizing in 
favor of costbenefit analysis as a useful device for evaluating 
public policy, the environmental, health, and safety advocacy 
community remains largely opposed to its use.5 Not only has this 
oppositional stance allowed advocacy groups to be portrayed as 
regulatory zealots, seeking ever higher standards no matter the 
costs, it also has meant that numerous opportunities to improve 
the practices and principles of costbenefit analysis have been 
missed.6 Retaking Rationality powerfully outlines those 
opportunities and encourages the advocacy community to abandon 
their objections and get in the game of using costbenefit analysis 
to justify environmental, health, and safety protection.7 
The two years that followed publication of Retaking 
Rationality offered ample opportunity to evaluate the books 
central message. President Obama campaigned on a platform that 
included strong environmental messages, including a commitment 
to engage the climate change problem promptly and aggressively.8 
In the opening moments of his administration, President Obama 
also signaled a strong desire to mend it, not end it9 when it 
comes to costbenefit analysis, both by nominating Cass Sunstein 
to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
within the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
                                                     
 3.  See id. at 911 (admonishing liberals for ceding the debate on costbenefit 
analysis, which ultimately led to the abundance of antiregulatory biases found in todays 
version of costbenefit analysis). 
 4. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 6 (footnote omitted). 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. at 8. 
 7. See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 1012 (explaining that costbenefit 
analysis is inevitable and criticizing environmentalists and other proregulatory interest 
groups for allowing the guidelines [to be] created with empty chairs in the room). 
 8.  See Barack Obama and Joe Biden: Promoting a Healthy Environment, 
BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/EnvironmentFactSheet.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (detailing the Obama campaigns environmental platform). 
 9. Cf. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 2 (suggesting a strategy of mending, 
not ending costbenefit analysis (quoting REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 10)). 
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and by issuing an announcement that regulatory costbenefit 
analysis would be retained in his administration but subjected to a 
thorough reevaluation to ensure consistency with such progressive 
goals as transparency in governance, incorporation of 
distributional and fairness concerns, respect for the interests of 
future generations, and avoidance of undue delay in rulemaking.10 
Subsequently, a series of high-profile disasters unfolded that 
might well have focused public attention on the importance of 
reforming energy, environmental, and climate change policies, 
underscoring both the direct and the secondary or ancillary 
benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel 
dependency that Livermore and Revesz rightly stress in their 
work.11 These disasters included the release of some 5.4 million 
cubic yards of potentially toxic coal ash from the Kingston Fossil 
Plant in Tennessee,12 the worst U.S. mine disaster in more than 
four decades at the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia,13 and 
the largest marine oil spill in history following an explosion that 
killed eleven workers on the Deepwater Horizon Oil rig in the Gulf 
of Mexico.14 In contrast to earlier disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, scientists also began to positively link extreme weather 
events to climate change, including massive fires and a deadly 
heat wave in Russia that was several standard deviations outside 
of normal fluctuations;15 flooding in Pakistan that killed more than 
                                                     
 10. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 3 C.F.R. 
343 (2010) [hereinafter Obama Memorandum] (implying continuance of costbenefit 
analysis by instructing the Director of the OMB to provide suggestions on the role of 
costbenefit analysis and suggesting the promulgation of a new executive order). 
 11. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 810. For a more extensive discussion 
explaining ancillary benefits, see Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of 
Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety 
Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 17901813 (2002). 
 12. Matthew Pearl, The Aftermath of the December 2008 Incident in East Tennessee 
Illuminates the Inadequate Regulation of Coal Ash Impoundments, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. 
L. 195, 19596 (2009). 
 13. Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found at Site of W. Va. Mine Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2010, at A1. 
 14. Clifford Krauss, Oil Spills Blow to BPs Image May Eclipse Out-of-Pocket Costs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at B1; Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the 
Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14. 
 15. But see NATL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, THE 
RUSSIAN HEAT WAVE OF 2010 (2010), available at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/csi/ 
moscow2010/ (indicating, in a draft report, that the Russian heat wave was caused by the 
meteorological phenomenon of blocking). This draft report concludes that greenhouse gas 
forcing fails to explain the 2010 heat wave over western Russia, primarily because it is not 
yet understood how greenhouse gas emissions may affect the frequency or intensity of 
blocking during summer, which is the direct atmospheric cause of the heat wave. Id. Other 
atmospheric scientists disagree and believe global warming at least played a role in 
exacerbating the Russian heat wave. Christine DellAmore, Russia Fires, Pakistan Floods 
Linked?, NATL GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
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1,700 people and destroyed billions of dollars worth of crops and 
infrastructure;16 andsurprisinglythe severe cold and 
snowstorms that affected the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic 
United States during the winter of 20092010.17 All of these 
developments coupled with solid Democratic majorities in both 
houses of Congress during the beginning of Obamas presidency 
seemed to set the stage for significant progress in the areas of 
environmental, health, and safety protection, supported by more 
rigorous and humane costbenefit analysis of just the sort that 
Livermore and Revesz advocate in Retaking Rationality. 
Unfortunately, a global economic recession also coincided 
with these developments and worked to destroy all apparent 
political appetite in the United States for environmental, health, 
and safety reform, especially in the area of climate change. 
Undoubtedly, the recession complicates any effort to assess the 
impact of improvements to costbenefit analysis that may have 
been achieved over the past two years: given the enormity of the 
recessions influence on public attitudes and political momentum, 
it would be foolish to speculate whether President Obamas 
                                                     
news/2010/08/100812-russian-wildfires-pakistan-floods-global-warming-science-environment/. 
The developing field of climate attribution science will help refine these conclusions, as 
this field offers ways of measuring the degree to which the probability of extreme 
weather events has been increased by anthropogenic warming. See Dáithí A. Stone et 
al., The Detection and Attribution of Human Influence on Climate, 34 ANN. REV. ENVT 
& RESOURCES 1, 912 (2009) (explaining research methods for the study of climate 
attribution). For instance, a study of the 2003 European heat wave, which resulted in the 
premature death of at least 35,000 people, concluded that the heat wave was two times more 
likely to have occurred as a result of the human contribution to global warming. Peter A. 
Stott, D.A. Stone & M.R. Allen, Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 2003, 432 
NATURE 610 (2004); see also Janet Larsen, Plan B Updates: Setting the Record Straight: 
More than 52,000 Europeans Died from Heat in Summer 2003, EARTH POLY INST. (July 28, 
2006), http://www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2006/update56 (reporting 
that early data indicating a death toll from the heat wave of approximately 35,000 
underestimated the actual number of heat-related deaths by 17,000). 
 16. Louise Gray, Pakistan Floods: Climate Change Experts Say Global Warming 
Could Be the Cause, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 10, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7937269/Pakistan-floods-climate-change-experts-say-global-
warming-could-be-the-cause.html; Pakistan Flood Damage Estimated at $9.7 Billion, 
CNN WORLD (Oct. 14, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-14/world/ 
pakistan.flood.cost_1_southern-sindh-province-malaria-cases-world-bank?_s=PM:WORLD. 
 17. The extreme cold and heavy snowstorm events experienced by the Eastern 
United States were attributed to a shift in Arctic air circulation patterns following release 
of greater levels of warmth that had been absorbed during Arctic summers due to 
declining sea ice. See J. Overland, M. Wang & J. Walsh, Atmosphere, in ARCTIC REPORT 
CARD: UPDATE FOR 2010 8, 11, 15 (2010), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/ 
ArcticReportCard_full_report.pdf. One hopes that this report was read by Senator Inhofe, 
who built an igloo with his family near the U.S. Capitol following a February 2010 
snowstorm and dubbed it Al Gores New Home in an apparent attempt to cast doubt on 
the reality of climate change. John M. Broder, Climate Fight Is Heating Up in Deep 
Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A1. 
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embrace of costbenefit analysisas opposed to the more overtly 
moralized rhetoric favored by the advocacy communitycausally 
contributed to the dearth of policy achievements over the last two 
years as weighed against promises and expectations formed 
during the campaign. Rather than attempt such a speculation, 
this Commentary, instead, will focus analytically on areas of 
improvement in the practice of costbenefit analysis that 
Livermore and Revesz highlight in their address, asking whether 
they do in fact represent salutary changes from prior practice. 
The specific areas addressed will be the incorporation of 
behavioral insights into regulatory design and impact analysis; 
the development of a uniform social cost of carbon for use in 
evaluating federal climate change regulations; and the 
institutional reform of costbenefit analysis practice to become 
more transparent and inclusive. It will be argued that many of 
these areas do indeed reflect valuable changes from prior 
practice, most notably in the emergence of an attitude of humility 
and circumspection within the costbenefit community with 
respect to estimating the social cost of carbon. Nevertheless, it 
will also be argued that the environmental, health, and safety 
advocacy community still faces a strategic dilemma more 
challenging and poignant than Livermore and Revesz appear to 
acknowledge. 
The developments reviewed in Livermore and Reveszs address 
and in this Commentary underscore the fact that costbenefit 
analysis is less certain and more pliable than ever before. In 
practice, the game of regulatory costbenefit analysis is just 
that, a structured exercise in which competing interests pursue 
policy outcomes not through direct argument and suasion, but 
through use of alternative assumptions, valuation techniques, 
discount rates, and other seemingly technical trappings of the 
costbenefit methodology. As a result, subjects of ordinary 
moral and political discourse become debated through a stylized 
costbenefit vernacular. This form of politics by other meanings 
has the benefit of tempering debate that might otherwise boil 
over into moralistic mud-slinging, culture wars, or worse. The 
cool language of costs and benefits just does not seem to engage 
peoples basic beliefs and worldviews in the same way as hot 
languages, such as religion and morality.18 But this cooling also 
                                                     
 18. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
47677 (1999) (noting that the language of deterrence is used in issues like capital 
punishment, gun control, and hate crimes because it doesnt speak to the contested 
expressive values that make these matters so contentious but rather cools . . . an engine 
of debate that is predisposed to run at a white hot temperature). 
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poses considerable costs, as this Commentary will attempt to 
show. Ultimately, what appears most sensible is that some 
segments of the environmental, health, and safety advocacy 
community follow Livermore and Reveszs advice and become 
adept at playing the costbenefit game in hopes of upsetting the 
current dynamic, which heavily favors regulated entities. Other 
segments, however, should continue to speak different truths to 
those same powers. 
II. NUDGES, FUDGES, AND SHOVES 
As Livermore and Revesz note, one major development in 
the costbenefit arena appears to be the mainstreaming of 
behavioral approaches to policy design, implementation, and 
evaluation.19 Although signaled early through President Obamas 
announcement regarding the possibility of a new executive order 
on regulatory impact analysis,20 this behavioral turn appeared 
most strongly in the OMBs annual report to Congress on the 
costs and benefits of federal regulatory programs21 and in a letter 
from Sunstein to agency heads that stressed the importance of 
using cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and other 
social sciences in the crafting of regulations.22 These 
recommendations appeared to come straight from the pages of 
Nudge, Sunsteins popular book cowritten with Richard Thaler. 
Nudge argues that conservatives and liberals should be able to 
agree on a wide variety of soft regulatory interventionsones 
designed to alter the choice architecture of individuals in a way 
that improves well-being without directly forcing behavioral 
changes.23 A favorite example from Nudge involves the use of a 
painted fly image inside the urinals of mens bathrooms, which 
                                                     
 19. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1923 (illustrating that the Obama 
Administration has, through the guidance of Cass Sunstein, integrated behavioral 
economics into regulatory decisionmaking). 
 20. Obama Memorandum, supra note 10. 
 21. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2009 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 3537 (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/2009_final_
BC_Report_01272010.pdf [hereinafter 2009 OMB REPORT]. 
 22. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Admr, OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. 
Depts & Agencies (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf (discussing strategies for 
implementing disclosure as a regulatory tool to measure individual and group behavior). 
 23.  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1314, 18396 (2008) (analyzing how through 
using subtle nudges, such as better incentives and better feedback, regulations can work 
to improve the environment). 
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apparently dramatically improves aim and thereby reduces 
cleaning costs.24 A weightier example is the use of an opt-out as 
opposed to an opt-in default standard for retirement savings 
programs, which can substantially enhance participation rates.25 
The idea is that, for a variety of reasons, individuals tend to 
underestimate their long-term savings needs. Altering the choice 
architecture in this way helps to overcome those cognitive 
limitations while still permitting individuals to opt-out if they 
desire. 
These are fine policies as far as they go, but the question 
remains: How far do they go? In its annual report, OMB wrote 
that [b]ehaviorally informed approaches can be applied in 
many domains, including financial regulation, public health, 
environmental protection, energy use, motor vehicle safety, and 
consumer protection.26 But the effectiveness and reach of 
nudges depends very much on context and goal. Take 
information disclosure rules, for instance. The OMB report 
suggests that mere disclosure of information on toxic chemical 
releases by businesses, as required under the federal Toxic 
Release Inventory program, can have a significant effect on 
behavior.27 No doubt reported releases have gone down, but it is 
not entirely clear whether these reports reflect actual 
reductions in releases or strategic reorganizations by regulated 
entities to avoid triggering whatever reporting threshold has 
been specified in the disclosure program. An important study by 
Lori Snyder Bennear of a similar disclosure regime at the state 
level in Massachusetts suggests the latter, concluding that up to 
40% of an apparent decline in toxic releases in that state may 
actually represent strategic adjustments to avoid reporting 
requirements.28 How widespread is this problem of 
circumvention and might behavioral-based regulations be 
especially vulnerable to it given their softness? It would be nice 
to know the answer before we give up on old-fashioned 
regulatory shoves. 
                                                     
 24. Id. at 34. 
 25. See id. at 10809 (comparing participation in retirement enrollment  
plansapproximately 20% enrollment rate after three months of retirement plans that 
were opt-in versus an immediate 90% enrollment rate of plans that were opt-out). 
 26. 2009 OMB REPORT, supra note 21, at 37. 
 27. See id. at 38 (praising the disclosure requirements of the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act for their significant beneficial effects, spurring 
reductions in toxic releases throughout the United States). 
 28. Lori S. Bennear, What Do We Really Know? The Effect of Reporting Thresholds 
on Inferences Using Environmental Right-to-Know Data, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 293, 295, 
304 (2008). 
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Even when a behavioral nudge is effective, the effect may be 
slight in comparison to our regulatory needs. For instance, 
household electricity consumption might indeed go down if we 
nudge individuals with emoticons on their utility bills that reveal 
whether they are more or less demanding than their neighbors.29 
But even the most bullish estimates of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions attainable through household efficiency measures 
merely suggest a slowing of growth in projected energy 
consumption.30 Overhyped scientific flaps notwithstanding, the 
worlds climate change experts agree that if we are to avoid 
potentially catastrophic and irreversible alteration of our 
atmosphere, oceans, and other planetary systems, we need to 
radically alter the way in which we provide energy, 
transportation, housing, food, and other essentials to humans 
everywhere on earth.31 Behavioral nudges appear to be weak 
sauce in the face of such a mega challengea limitation that 
Sunstein and Thaler do acknowledge in their book, which is why 
they instead advocate a cap-and-trade system for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.32 Still, even a cap-and-trade or other 
market-based system may fail to deliver the transformation 
needed most critically because, as discussed below in Part III, 
they tend to be tied to economic costbenefit analyses that are 
tuned only to recommend marginal, incremental changes to an 
otherwise unquestioned status quo. 
                                                     
 29. See Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman & Alice Shih, Evidence from Two Large Field 
Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage 1 
(Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15386, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15386 (explaining that descriptive and injunctive messages, 
including emoticons, have lowered energy consumption in at least two separate studies). 
On the other hand, a study of electricity usage among Californian households by Dora 
Costa and Matthew Kahn found that conservatives tend to ignore comparative electricity 
use information or even increase their consumption in response to such information. See 
Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Energy Conservation Nudges and Environmentalist 
Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment 24, 1516 
(Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15939, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15939. 
 30. See, e.g., HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 7, 8 & exhibit 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/electricpowernaturalgas/downloads/us_energy_ 
efficiency_full_report.pdf (illustrating that increased energy efficiency will only slow the rate of 
growth); NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, POLICY BRIEF: BOOSTING ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
NATIONWIDE THROUGH MEASUREMENT AND PERFORMANCE-BASED REWARDS (2009), available 
at http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/cap2.0/files/efficiencyperformance.pdf (examining the 
effects of programs designed to increase energy efficiency). 
 31. See, e.g., G8+5 ACADEMIES JOINT STATEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES FOR A LOW CARBON FUTURE (2009), available 
at http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/G8+5energy-climate09.pdf (Climate change 
and sustainable energy supply are crucial challenges for the future of humanity.). 
 32. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 18486. 
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To date, our most successful environmental, health, and 
safety regulations have come in the form of shoves, not nudges. 
And the shoves have not been market-based: the Clean Air Act, 
which dominates OMBs table of monetized regulatory benefits 
from federal regulations,33 is primarily built on health-based 
and technology-based standards, not on the kind of nudge-based 
or market-based regulations that now crowd environmental 
policy discussions. Even the much vaunted acid rain trading 
program, which proponents claim has proven the effectiveness 
of cap-and-trade, presents a decidedly unclear lesson when 
studied carefully. Much of the programs apparent success has 
come from regulatory and economic developments unrelated to the 
cap-and-trade feature itself, and the programs future is clouded 
by a potential problem of overallocated and banked permitsa 
problem that seems well-nigh universal to cap-and-trade 
programs.34 Because cap-and-trade and other greenhouse gas 
legislation is all but dead in Congress, the burden has fallen to 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement 
greenhouse gas controls through the Clean Air Act. Yet a worry 
remains that OIRAwhich will oversee the EPAs efforts using 
costbenefit analysis, notwithstanding the choice of alternative 
standards in the Clean Air Act itself35aims to set up a 
presumption in favor of nudge-based regulation, perhaps followed 
by market-based schemes like cap-and-trade if nudges are shown 
to be inadequate, and then finally to traditional regulatory 
techniques if market-based approaches are demonstrated 
ineffective. Based on our actual history with regulatory design 
and implementation, however, the presumptions should well 
work in the opposite direction. 
At the risk of sounding like one of the paranoid costbenefit 
opponents that Livermore and Revesz seek to calm and 
encourage, the addition of behavioral economics and related 
insights to regulatory impact analysis seems to be working in a 
predictably antiregulatory fashion. Rather than offering a set of 
complementary policy tools that stand alongside more traditional 
                                                     
 33. See 2009 OMB REPORT, supra note 21, at 1011 tbl.1-2 (the Office of Airs 
estimated benefits are 82 to 580 million dollars; the next closest regulation has only 16 to 
17 million dollars in benefits). 
 34. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: 
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 41213 (2009) (noting that 
emissions were falling between 1990 and 1995 due to economic factors unrelated to the 
[Acid Rain Program] and that the Acid Rain Program was characterized by early 
overallocation). 
 35. Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1097, 110406 (2006) (describing OIRAs stringent review of rules enacted by 
the EPA under the Clean Water Act). 
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regulatory measures, the behavioral turn seems instead to be 
adding another layer of gamesmanship within which proponents 
of environmental, health, and safety protection must compete, 
struggling to overcome a series of ideological presumptions 
against altering the status quo. Consider the role of behavioral 
insights in two recent and significant rulemakings. First, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
sought to implement a requirement of the 2007 federal energy 
bill that the agency create a Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer 
Information Program, consisting of both a rating system of tire 
fuel efficiency and a labeling program to convey the information 
to consumers.36 Despite the fact that the agency conducted 
extensive focus group and survey testing of its proposed labeling 
program, OIRA rejected it because the agency had not conducted 
scientifically valid experiments that were capable of quantifying 
consumers understandings of the label.37 Thus chastened, 
NHTSA only was able to finalize its rules for tire fuel efficiency 
rating, and the agency continues to work on OIRAs demand for 
further research with respect to labeling.38 When it eventually 
proposes a new labeling program, NHTSA will be forced to 
undergo another notice and comment period and OIRA review 
process. Thus, the incorporation of behavioral insights here seems 
to have strengthened the burden of proof facing the regulating 
agency, adding further cost and delay to the rulemaking process. 
Next, consider the EPAs experience attempting to regulate 
coal ash waste, the most hotly contested environmental, health, 
and safety issue in the Obama Administration to date.39 In this 
long overdue rulemaking,40 the EPA proposed to regulate coal ash 
                                                     
 36. Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Admr, OIRA, to David Strickland, Admr, 
NHTSA (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/ 
Tire_Fuel_Efficiency_Consumer_Information_Final_Rule.pdf.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,894, 
15,900 (Mar. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 575). 
 39. This proposal has attracted intense scrutiny, with OIRA meeting some forty-two 
times with interested parties; an amount which, at the time, represented more than half of 
all OIRA meetings on EPA rules and some 30% of all OIRA meetings on any Obama 
Administration rule. James Goodwin, Eye on OIRA: Coal Ash Meetings Up to 42, or More 
Than Half of All OIRA Meetings on EPA Rules, CPR BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=CE877002-A1A5-ADAC-34017 
AC4184F218A. [OIRAs] review of the [EPAs proposed] coal ash rule lasted over six 
monthswell past the 120-day limit that Executive Order 12866 allowe[ed]. Letter 
from Sidney Shapiro et al., Ctr. for Progressive Reform, to OIRA (June 23, 2010), 
available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/2010_CPR_Comments_OMB_report.pdf 
[hereinafter Letter to OIRA]. 
 40. The EPA has proposed regulating coal ash as hazardous waste since 1978. 
Hazardous Waste Guidelines and Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 59,015 (proposed Dec. 
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that is a byproduct of electricity production and that contains a 
variety of heavy metals, carcinogens, and other materials known 
to be hazardous to human health. Over 100 million tons of the 
waste are generated each year and threaten to contaminate 
groundwater and cause harmful ecological and human health 
effects, both by leaching from unlined waste impoundments and 
through catastrophic releases such as the 2008 Kingston 
incident.41 The EPA originally recommended that coal ash be 
listed as a Subtitle C hazardous waste and subjected to the 
requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).42 Following OIRA review, however, the agency revised 
the proposal to include both its original plan (albeit with an 
unprecedented special waste designation in place of the 
familiar hazardous waste terminology) and another 
significantly less stringent alternative that would essentially 
treat coal ash little different from household waste.43 Although 
OIRAs concerns about the EPAs original proposal were many, 
one prominent argument raised in support of watering down the 
proposal was a speculative concern by industry that classification 
of coal ash as a hazardous waste might give rise to a stigma 
effect whereby the beneficial reuse of coal ash would no longer 
be economically viable.44 At present, some coal ash is recycled and 
used in road paving material, construction concrete, and other 
safe and beneficial applications.45 Even though the EPA was 
careful to note in the proposal that it was not altering an earlier 
determination that such beneficially reused coal ash is exempt 
from RCRAs hazardous waste regulations,46 industry 
                                                     
18, 1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250); see also Final Regulatory Determination on Four 
Large-Volume Wastes from the Combustion of Coal by Electric Utility Power Plants, 58 
Fed. Reg. 42,466, 42,466 (Aug. 9, 1993) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261) (memorializing the 
initial EPA proposal to regulate coal ash in December 1978). 
 41. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of 
Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 35,128, 35,132, 35,143 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 
261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 302). 
 42. Hazardous Waste Guidelines and Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. at 58,891; Letter to 
OIRA, supra note 39, at 56. 
 43. Letter to OIRA, supra note 39, at 57. 
 44. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of 
Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 35,156, 35,159. 
 45. See Citizens for Recycling First, Proposed EPA Disposal Regulations Threaten 
Coal Ash Recycling, http://www.recyclingfirst.org/pdfs/53.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) 
(commending coal ashs ability to strengthen concrete, reduce the use of cement, and 
conserve[ ] natural resources and save[ ] energy). 
 46. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing 
of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 35,129 (EPA is not proposing to affect the current status of coal combustion 
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representatives argued that stringent regulation of remaining 
coal ash would unduly taint beneficially reused waste 
material.47 The price tag for this unintended behavioral 
consequence of regulation$233.5 billion in lost benefitswas 
an amount that dramatically tilted the costbenefit calculus 
against regulation.48 For its part, OIRA seems to have been so 
taken with industrys argument that it admonished the EPA not 
to even identify the Subtitle C option as preferred among the 
new alternatives because that designation alone may have 
unintended consequences on beneficial reuse, even if an 
alternative option is selected for final [adoption].49 
Empirical support for the coal ash stigma effect is 
surprisingly thin, despite the significance afforded it during the 
regulatory review process. The argument seems to be that [e]nd 
users of products containing coal ash are highly susceptible to 
messages that create fear and doubt. (Do you want hazardous 
waste in your home and your childs school?)50 As Rena Steinzor 
has argued, actual academic research on stigma effects appears 
both difficult to interpret and far afield from the specific context 
of coal ash reuse.51 One study cited by Sunstein, for instance, 
                                                     
residuals [or coal ash] that are beneficially used.); id. at 35,128 (EPA is not proposing to 
change the May 2000 Regulatory Determination for beneficially used CCRs, which are 
currently exempt from the hazardous waste regulations . . . .); id. at 35,162 (EPA does 
not wish to inhibit or eliminate the significant and measurable environmental and 
economic benefits derived from the use of this valuable material without a demonstration 
of an environmental or health threat.). 
 47. An industry front group known as Citizens for Recycling First has been a 
leading purveyor of this stigma theory. See Citizens for Recycling First, supra note 45 
(The Subtitle C hazardous approach would seriously damage recycling by creating an 
unnecessary hazardous waste stigma on coal ash.). The stigma claim also has been 
repeatedly urged by industry representatives in various hearings. For an example of one 
of these hearings, see Coal Combustion Byproducts: Potential Impact of a Hazardous 
Waste Designation on Small Businesses in the Recycling Industry: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 1920, 4549 (2010) (statement of Thomas H. Adams, 
Executive Director, American Coal Ash Association) (We believe this hazardous 
designation would create a stigma resulting in rejection by the market place . . . .). 
 48. See Rena Steinzor, OIRAs Fuzzy Math on Coal Ash: A Billion Here, a 
Billion There, CPR BLOG (July 13, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/ 
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=CD428D4F-DCDE-9091-533F4195CE25C5E4 (characterizing the 
high cost of the stigma effect as dwarf[ing] any expected benefits of regulation by 
several orders of magnitude).  
 49. Interagency Working Comments on Draft Rule Under EO 12866 (Document ID: 
EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0350), REGULATIONS.GOV (May 20, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0350 [hereinafter 
Interagency Working Comments] (open document by clicking on the PDF icon). 
 50. Citizens for Recycling First, supra note 45. 
 51. See Office of Res. Conservation & Recovery, EPA, Public Hearing on EPAs 
Proposed Rule on Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and 
Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities 
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/fossil/ccr-rule/transcripts/ 
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found that subjects were unwilling to drink juice from a glass 
that had recently contained a cockroach, even though the 
subjects were assured that the cockroach had been completely 
sterilized.52 That same study was relied upon by economists in 
a study for the EPA of Superfund site designation to construct 
a model of human behavior in which people replace 
calculations of risk versus benefit with a simple heuristic of 
shunning, the avoidance of the stigmatized object.53 Just as 
the heuristics and biases literature more generally has been 
interpreted to suggest that individuals often misconstrue and 
mispursue their best interests,54 the EPA economists concluded 
that while shunning may have evolved from an adaptive 
response to avoid contaminated food, it can be triggered in 
inappropriate circumstances.55 Thus, because subjects were 
unwilling to drink juice from a glass that had contained a 
sterilized cockroachand indeed because [s]ubjects refused 
to drink the juice even if it had been in the freezer for one 
year56individuals more generally are assumed to be prone to 
hysterical overreaction to risk. Consistent with this assumption, 
the EPA economists found that Superfund cleanup delays of ten 
to twenty years increase the chance of stigmatization for 
properties surrounding designated sites, such that the benefits of 
an eventual cleanup may never be reflected in restored property 
values.57 
One might be forgiven for wondering what these studies 
have to do with coal ash. Even the Superfund study sheds little 
light, as the event triggering taint in that context was a 
designation of hazardous status by the EPA and a subsequent 
                                                     
transcript-arlington-va.pdf (statement of Rena Steinzor, President, Ctr. for Progressive 
Reform) (discussing the negative effects of ORIAs cost-benefit analysis). 
 52. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 969, 97475 (2006) (citing Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from 
the Study of Contagion, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 31, 32 (James Flynn et al. eds., 
2001)). 
 53. See WILLIAM SCHULZE ET AL., STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF 
SUPERFUND 2324 (2004), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/ 
EE-0486-01.pdf/$file/EE-0486-01.pdf (Superfund sites might be stigmatized . . . like the 
cockroached juice.). 
 54. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1700, 175156 (2003) (reviewing and critiquing this literature and discussing the 
competing theories about the effect of marketing on consumers). 
 55. See SCHULZE ET AL., supra note 53, at 24. 
 56. Id. at 2324. Also of apparent surprise was the fact that stigma appeared to be 
insensitive to dose. Id. That is, [a]ny contact was sufficient for subjects to shun the 
juice and [r]eductions in the duration of contact between juice and cockroach had little 
effect. Id. 
 57. Id. at 40, 41 & tbl.1.5. 
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failure to clean the site up for one or more decades.58 In the coal 
ash context, on the other hand, the EPA has specifically 
exempted beneficially reused materials from hazardous 
designation.59 Why then was industry allowed to extrapolate 
from a study on cockroach juice to a multibillion dollar claim 
about coal ash reuse, while the NHTSA was forced to conduct 
scientifically valid experiments capable of quantifying precise 
consumer reactions to the precise labeling matter at issue? In 
these two rulemakings at least, the addition of behavioral 
sciences seems only to have given industry more weaponry with 
which to delay regulations and fudge calculation of their 
impacts. One can only suspect that industrys coal ash argument 
received prominent attention because OIRA and the White 
House also opposed the EPAs proposal on other grounds.60 
Especially unsettling is the fact that researchers at the Institute 
for Policy Integritywho have been hard at work putting the 
messages of Retaking Rationality into practiceconducted a 
careful, evenhanded costbenefit analysis of a stringent 
approach to coal ash regulation and found anticipated net 
benefits of billions of dollars, even before considering a panoply 
of nonquantified benefits that also would have followed from 
stringent regulation.61 Yet the Institute for Policy Integrity 
report appeared little able to influence the coal ash regulatory 
battle, despite one of the most seemingly friendly political 
contexts proponents of environmental, health, and safety 
protection have faced or will face in years. 
                                                     
 58. See id. at 8, 3637 (discussing the effects of stigmatization on property values at 
Superfund sites where cleanups took longer than expected). 
 59. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of 
Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 35,128, 35,128 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 
264, 265, 268, 271, 302). 
 60. An aside: One of the earliest and most influential psychological studies on 
stigma and taboo was Jonathan Haidts exploration of the psychology of moral reasoning. 
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001). Through a series of vignettes that 
sought to trigger a taboo response in subjects when instrumental considerations justifying 
the taboo were absentsuch as a hypothetical in which adult siblings decide to engage in 
sexual relations using two forms of birth control and with no apparent adverse emotional 
effectsHaidt sought to demonstrate that individuals often experience an intuitive moral 
judgment first and only then proceed to offer rational accounts of their judgments. Id. at 
814, 817. In the context of costbenefit analysis, a similar form of post-hoc reasoning often 
seems to appear: a political goal is established first and then regulatory impact 
analysesincluding new ones rooted in behavioral scienceare constructed to justify the 
previously established goal. 
 61. See J. SCOTT HOLLADAY, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, NO MORE EXCUSES: THE 
ECONOMIC CASE FOR COAL ASH REGULATION 2, 24 (2009), available at http://www.iowadnr.gov/ 
epc/09jun/nomoreexcuses.pdf. 
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III. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
The most important methodological development for 
regulatory costbenefit analysis over the last two years was the 
creation of a uniform federal measure of the social cost of carbon. 
An interagency task force was created to conduct this exercise 
andalthough the identity of its members was never revealed, 
its meeting times and locations disclosed, or its draft report 
opened to public commentthe task force did solicit some public 
input to inform its deliberations. The resulting report is notable 
primarily for its circumspection: throughout the document, the 
task force acknowledges serious limitations and shortcomings in 
the costbenefit methodology as applied to the climate change 
problem.62 Some of these moments of candor and humility even 
broach fundamental ethical subjectssuch as the appropriate 
treatment of future generations via the discount ratethat 
costbenefit proponents have tended to elide in past 
discussions.63 For these reasons and others, the task force should 
be applauded. Nevertheless, after contemplating the various 
limitations and shortcomings acknowledged by the task force, it 
is hard not to be left wondering why a social cost of carbon 
estimate is useful at all. The more natural conclusion seems to 
be, as even ardent supporters of costbenefit analysis have 
recently acknowledged,64 that the social cost of carbon is simply 
the wrong tool for the climate change job. Indeed, it is a tool that 
containsburied deep within its assumptionsdeceptively 
narrow and limited answers to the most fundamental policy 
questions raised by climate change. 
To understand this problem, imagine the pursuit of 
social-welfare maximization as a quest to crest a mountain. As 
anyone who has ever climbed an actual mountain knows, the 
surest route to the top is not the path that follows an incremental 
                                                     
 62. For one example of the task force acknowledging this limitation, see 
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOVT, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 4 
(2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf [hereinafter 
TASK FORCE REPORT], wherein the task force states: In this context, statements 
recognizing the limitations of the analysis and calling for further research take on 
exceptional significance. The interagency group offers the new [social cost of carbon] 
values with all due humility about the uncertainties embedded in them and with a sincere 
promise to continue to work to improve them. 
 63. Id. at 1719. 
 64. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of 
CostBenefit Analysis 3234 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working Paper No. 525, 2d series, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662147 (noting the many shortcomings of using the social cost of 
carbon in a costbenefit analysis). 
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gain in elevation at every step. Nevertheless, constant, steady 
ascension is a workable heuristic, and it is precisely this 
heuristic that is offered by costbenefit analysis: by evaluating 
proposed changes to the status quo in terms of incremental 
welfare consequences, costbenefit analysis promises to 
determine whether any given policy change will lead us 
marginally higher up the mountain of social welfare. The 
fundamental problem in the climate change context is that 
costbenefit analysis cannot tell us whether we are on the right 
mountain. While scrambling meticulously over the details of any 
costbenefit exercise, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that at 
base of the exercise lies a set of fundamental assumptions about 
resource rights, income distribution, population size, 
intergenerational equity, international obligation, the state of 
technology and the likelihood of clean energy innovation, the 
trajectory of the economy, and so on. Alter these assumptions 
and one stands on a different mountain, where costbenefit 
analysis once again can offer advice on whether a proposed 
incremental step will lead us up or down. In the climate change 
context, the near universal view of natural scientists is that we 
are currently on the wrong mountain.65 Indeed, because of 
tipping points in both ecological and socioeconomic systems, we 
are heading up a mountain with a cliff at its peak. Thus, we are 
well-advised at present to take policy steps that may appear 
inefficient when measured by marginalist costbenefit analysis 
that is fixed to the assumptions of the status quo. In other words, 
we may have to climb down for a while before we can again start 
ascending a different peak. The ultimate result will be a 
mountain with a better and more enduring view, but the path of 
transition will not be a smooth, continuous, and incremental one, 
as marginalist costbenefit analysis presumes. 
The task force report does stress at the outset this 
fundamental distinction between choosing and climbing a 
mountain, or to put the point more technically, between general 
and partial equilibrium; dynamic and static efficiency; and 
comprehensive and marginal analysis.66 Nevertheless, the 
authors state in the report that their marginal social cost of 
carbon estimate will be useful because [m]ost federal regulatory 
actions can be expected to have [only] marginal impacts on global 
                                                     
 65. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining that climate change 
experts argue that basic assumptions about the methods used to provide essentials, such 
as housing and food, must be altered before any true progress may be made in halting 
climate change). 
 66. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 24. 
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emissions.67 The danger here is that the authors assertion will 
become self-fulfilling: whether the Clean Air Act offers marginal 
or inframarginal possibilities for altering greenhouse gas 
emissions trajectories depends very much on whether the EPA 
decides to implement the statute with the vigorous health-based 
and technology-forcing teeth it was originally designed to have. 
For instance, when viewed individually, energy investment 
decisions, such as whether to license new coal-fired power 
plants, may appear to represent only marginal alterations to 
our status quo trajectory of emissions growth, especially in light 
of the ever-shrinking share of global emissions that the United 
States represents as a whole.68 But when one considers the 
durability of such investmentswhich often exceed even their 
lengthy planned capital cycles due to the benefit of regulatory 
grandfathering69combined with the fact that they occur within 
a national policy space in which dozens of such individual 
decisions are constantly being made, then the EPAs 
implementation of the Clean Air Act may well be seen to raise an 
infra-marginal decision about the future trajectory of the nations 
energy infrastructure. Such an implementation would represent 
precisely the kind of transformative, general equilibrium-shifting 
action that the task force authors rightly note may be 
inappropriate for ordinary costbenefit analysis.70 However, if the 
EPAs ambitious implementation must be submitted to 
marginalist costbenefit review by OIRA, then the significance 
                                                     
 67. Id. at 2. This is why it is not entirely a good thing that market failures 
remain a central element of regulatory impact analysis, despite the Obama 
Administrations withdrawal of a formal requirement that specific market failures be 
identified in connection with rulemaking proposals. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, 
at 15. Unless the market failure concept is expanded to include an unsustainable general 
equilibrium as a condition justifying regulatory action, the concept will fail to 
acknowledge the necessity of market interventions precisely when they are needed most. 
This is why it is also not obvious that we should seek much needed consistency across 
agencies through use of a uniform social cost of carbon measure. Livermore & Revesz, 
supra note 1, at 25. Different agencies implementing different statutes will implicate 
different time horizons and different degrees of potential intervention into the status quo 
trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions. These different contexts may well require social 
cost of carbon measures that are tailored specifically to the analytical task at hand. 
 68. T.A. Boden, G. Marland & R.J. Andres, Carbon Dioxide Info Analysis Ctr., U.S. 
Dept of Energy, United States of America Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions: Trends (2010), 
http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_usa.html. 
 69. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and 
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1677, 171718 (2007) (noting that power plants grandfathered in under the Clean 
Air Act have been operating far beyond expected retirement dates). 
 70. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 2 (For policies that have a large 
(nonmarginal) impact on global cumulative emissions, there is a separate question of 
whether the [social cost of carbon] is an appropriate tool for calculating the benefits of 
reduced emissions . . . .). 
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and aim of the regulations will not be understood and will be 
misleadingly condemned as inefficient. 
The integrated assessment models relied on by the task force 
all are built on assumptions about matters that are central to the 
climate change problem but that are not allowed to surface for 
direct inspection. That is, the cost and benefit outputs of the 
models depend critically on assumptions about such matters as 
whether and how quickly economies will decarbonize through 
technology innovation, what level of adaptive capacity 
communities will have to lessen the impacts of climate change, 
what population policies the United States and other nations will 
pursue, and so on.71 These matters are treated as fixed inputs 
into the models rather than as themselves subjects of policy 
choice. As a result, regulations altering the trajectory of these 
matters will be assessed using the social cost of carbon, but the 
apparent costs and benefits of such regulations will be 
misleadingly calculated. For instance, none of the models allow 
for the possibility that major shifts in U.S. policy will cause other 
nations to follow suit, such that the business-as-usual emissions 
trajectory will be lowered by an amount far greater than reflected 
by the direct reduction of the U.S. policy change. Accordingly, the 
apparent benefits of U.S. climate policy proposals will be 
systematically understated by the models if indeed it is trueas 
countless knowledgeable observers suggest72that U.S. 
recalcitrance has become the major stumbling block to 
international progress. 
Consider some further telling examples drawn from the 
three integrated assessment models used by the task force.73 
Each of the three models has been criticized in academic 
literature for making selective and optimistic assumptions about 
                                                     
 71. See id. at 49, 15 (describing various models relied on by the task force and 
discussing the underlying assumptions of each model). 
 72. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: 
Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POLY REV. 245 
(2010) (maintaining that the U.S. policy favoring incremental domestic legislation may 
impede efforts to develop a comprehensive international approach to combat climate 
change). 
 73. Far from an exhaustive literature review, drawing on the work of the most 
preeminent scholars in the area, Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 24, the task force 
report actually reflects a highly selective sampling of the relevant modeling work. FRANK 
ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1, 7 (2010), available at 
http://sei-us.org/Publications_PDF/SEI-E3-SocialCostCarbon-10.pdf. Indeed, the EPAs 
Climate Economic Modeling webpage does not even list the FUND, PAGE, and DICE 
models relied upon by the task force but does list several other more complex and updated 
models not used by the task force. See EPA, Climate Economic Modeling, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/modeling.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2009) 
(listing economic model types typically relied upon by the EPA). 
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the damages to be expected from a warming world.74 The 
PAGE2002 model, for instance, makes heroic assumptions about 
the ability of both developed and developing nations to adapt to 
climate change without cost,75 while Richard Tols FUND model 
takes such a rosy view of climate change impacts that increased 
air conditioning costs represent the majority of anticipated 
damages.76 Indeed, the FUND model is built on such optimistic 
assumptions that it calculates net gains from climate change up 
to a 3oC temperature increase,77 even though the active 
discussion in the natural sciences community is whether even a 
2oC increase can be sustained without passing a threshold 
beyond which humanity would suffer fundamental and 
irreparable harm to life-supporting systems.78 The third 
modelWilliam Nordhauss long-influential DICE modeldoes 
attempt to incorporate catastrophic damages of this sort, but it 
does so through an outdated and subjective survey that predicts 
only a 4% probability of a catastrophe (defined narrowly) at 2.5oC 
warming.79 The result is that temperature can increase to 
                                                     
 74. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 73, at 1. 
 75. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 7 (assuming that developed countries 
could adapt to climate change and eliminate up to 90% of all economic impact and 
developing countries could eliminate up to 50% of economic impact). 
 76. See id. at 8 n.4. 
 77. See id. at 9 n.5 ([T]he damages from FUND may cross from negative to positive 
at less than or greater than 3°C.). Likewise, the FUND model also finds a substantial 
reduction in mortality during the early stages of global warming. See id. at 78 
(describing the FUND model as including separately calibrated damage functions for 
such sectors as sea level rise and human health); Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the 
Damage Costs of Climate Change, 21 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 47, 59, 6162 (2002) 
(illustrating the estimated change in mortality due to a slight rise of global mean 
temperatures). 
 78. See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity 
Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 225 (2008), http://www.bentham.org/open/ 
toascj/articles/V002/217TOASCJ.pdf (citing several organizations that have determined as 
little as a 2°C increase could be dangerous). Indeed, at a 5% discount rate, the FUND 
model produces a negative total social cost of carbon, given that losses in the far future 
are unable to overcome the supposed net benefits from warming in the near term. 
ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 73, at 14−15. 
 79. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 32. Compare the more recent expert 
elicitation procedure of Kriegler et al., which found dramatically higher subjective 
likelihoods for several catastrophic tipping point scenarios over a 50300 year time 
horizon and associated with various warming ranges from 0.51.5oC up to 35oC. Elmar 
Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping Points in the Climate System, 
106 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 5041, 5044−45 (2009). An important methodological 
difference between the two surveys is that Krieglers respondents consisted only of 
physical scientists asked to estimate the likelihood of specific natural occurrences, while 
Nordhaus surveyed physical and social scientists and asked them to estimate the 
likelihood of a catastrophe defined narrowly as a percentage loss of global GDP. Compare 
id. at 5041, with William D. Nordhaus, Expert Opinion on Climatic Change, 82 AM. 
SCIENTIST 45, 4647 (1994). 
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unfathomable levels within the DICE model without 
fundamentally affecting world economic output. Indeed, only one 
half of global GDP would be lost in the DICE model at a 
temperature increase of 19oC.80 Consider this outcome in light of 
recent calculations of a climate change adaptability limit due to 
the human bodys inability to avoid hyperthermia above a certain 
temperature: We conclude that a global-mean warming of 
roughly 7oC would create small zones where metabolic heat 
dissipation would for the first time become impossible, calling 
into question their suitability for human habitation. A warming 
of 1112oC would expand these zones to encompass most of 
todays human population.81 
How can it be that one half of global GDP would continue to 
be generated and enjoyed at a temperature level several degrees 
Celsius above this adaptability limit? Quite simply because harm 
of that sort is an inframarginal event not contemplated by the 
models damage function. Rather than positing some degree of 
fundamental dependence between socioeconomic and natural 
systems, integrated assessment models typically assume that the 
economy will continue to function more or less as is, even as 
damages from climate change grow ever larger. In the extreme, 
this means that global GDP can continue to pour forth within the 
models even after all presently inhabited land on earth has been 
rendered unsuitable for human existence. The possibility of such 
extreme climate change scenarios suggests that costbenefit 
optimizing may simply be the wrong framework for analyzing 
climate change policy. Rather than optimal consumption 
smoothing over time, policymakers instead should consider 
climate change from an insurance perspective, asking how 
much of present consumption is worth investing in the 
avoidance of truly intolerable outcomes.82 After all, as Frank 
Ackerman and Elizabeth Stanton note, a typical American 
family home is only expected to burn down once every 250 
years, yet no one foregoes homeowners insurance on the theory 
that their mean lifetime experience will be fire-free.83 Nor do 
they ask whether insurance is worthwhile to purchase based on 
                                                     
 80. See Frank Ackerman, Elizabeth A. Stanton & Ramón Bueno, Fat Tails, 
Exponents, Extreme Uncertainty: Simulating Catastrophe in DICE, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
1657, 1660 (2010). 
 81. Steven C. Sherwood & Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate 
Change Due to Heat Stress, 107 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 9552, 9554 (2010). 
 82. See Martin L. Weitzman, Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at 
Its Lowest Possible Rate, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 201, 202 (1998) ([W]e must now 
make investment decisions having consequences that will occur in th[e] hazy future.). 
 83. ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 73, at 13. 
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its costs and benefits adjusted by some decontextualized risk 
aversion premium. Instead, they ask whether the specific event 
in questiondestruction of their homeis something they can 
abide.84 Policymakers similarly should be asking whether the 
catastrophic outcomes associated with business-as-usual 
emissions trajectories represent something that humanity can 
abide: Does the present generation want to countenance disaster 
among its legacy of achievements? Because catastrophic climate 
change scenarios are essentially uninsurable events, this mode of 
thinking leads to a goal of prevention along lines the scientific 
community has been urging all along: rather than a system in 
which all resources are optimally deployed to their highest value 
use, we should instead seek a system that displays 
characteristics like precaution, diversification, resilience, 
redundancy, and innovative capacitycharacteristics that may 
appear to represent an inefficient use of resources from a 
narrow economic viewpoint but that may be essential 
nonetheless.85 
Matters worsen when one considers the fundamental model 
parameter of climate sensitivity, which is a measure of the 
average global temperature increase associated with a doubling 
of pre-Industrial atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. In 
this respect, the task force followed prevailing practices by using 
a climate sensitivity range that does not include long-term 
feedback effects from temperature increase, such as those that 
would be associated with loss of continental ice sheets, methane 
release from oceans and permafrost, Amazonian dieback, and so 
on. These estimates tend to hover between 1.5 and 4.5oC, 
although the range of uncertainty has actually increased as 
science has progressedan important and underappreciated 
                                                     
 84. See id. (comparing the notion that the cost of prevention will pale[ ] in 
comparison to irreversibly destabilizing the earths climate with the risk of losing ones 
house versus the cost of insurance). 
 85. Even with respect to more mundane consequences of climate change, the 
three models relied upon by the task force are frustratingly incomplete and selective. 
For instance, none considers co-benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, which Livermore 
and Revesz rightly cite as the most weighty and policy-relevant example of such 
ancillary benefits of regulation. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 910. 
Consequences that are included often seem rather arbitrary. At least in one iteration of 
the DICE model, anticipated benefits from expanded outdoor recreational opportunities 
in a warmer world tended to swamp increased mortality and morbidity. See Robert P. 
Murphy, Rolling the DICE: William Nordhauss Dubious Case for a Carbon Tax, 14 
INDEP. REV. 197, 20406 & tbl.1 (2009). For further discussion of this point, see 
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE 110 (2010). The current iteration still 
seems to include an assumption that most individuals would be willing to pay 
substantial amounts simply for the benefit of living in a warmer climate. ACKERMAN 
AND STANTON, supra note 73, at 10−11. 
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dynamic in its own right.86 A study by Mark Pagani and 
colleagues attempts to improve climate sensitivity estimates by 
looking at ice records over extremely long time periods to 
establish an estimate of climate sensitivity that includes major 
earth-systems in equilibrium, including long-term feedbacks.87 
About 5 million years ago, carbon dioxide was as high as or only 
slightly higher than 2009 values, and the Earth reached 
temperatures 4oC warmer than now, with sea levels tens of 
meters higher than at present.88 Pagani and his colleagues 
conclude that the climate is much more sensitive than 
commonly assumed. Indeed, if the researchers climate 
sensitivity estimate were applied to our contemporary situation, 
then even if we stopped emitting today we might still get 2oC of 
warming over time, and if we continue to a doubling of pre-
Industrial concentrations we could be looking at over 10oC of 
increase, rather than the much more modest amount assumed 
by the task force.89 Recall that 1112oC poses a likely 
adaptability limit beyond which all currently inhabited land on 
earth may no longer support human existence.90 
Of course, paleontology work of the sort conducted by Pagani 
and his colleagues looks at time horizons that span much longer 
than might be considered relevant from a policy perspective.91 
Within costbenefit analysis, the controversial but prevalent 
practice of discounting ensures that policy impacts of any size in 
the far-distant future tend to have little, if any, quantitative 
significance in determining costbenefit outcomes. The task force 
authors again should be applauded for forthrightly and 
unblinkingly acknowledging that the practice of discounting 
raises fundamental ethical questions regarding the care and 
consideration present generations owe to future generations.92 
                                                     
 86. Mark Pagani et al., High Earth-System Climate Sensitivity Determined From 
Pliocene Carbon Dioxide Concentrations, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 27, 27 (2010), available 
at http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/v3/n1/pdf/ngeo724.pdf. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 27, 29; Kenneth G. Miller, Sea Level Change, Last 250 Million Years, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PALEOCLIMATOLOGY AND ANCIENT ENVIRONMENTS 879, 885 fig.57 
(Vivien Gornitz ed., 2009). 
 89. Pagani et al., supra note 86, at 27, 29. 
 90. Sherwood & Huber, supra note 81, at 9554. 
 91. See, e.g., Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the Earths Climate 
System, 105 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 1786, 1787, 1791 (2008) (placing limits on the 
political time horizon . . . based on the human life span and our (limited) ability to 
consider the world we are leaving for our grandchildren). 
 92. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 17 (The choice of a discount rate, 
especially over long periods of time, raises highly contested and exceedingly difficult 
questions of science, economics, philosophy, and law.). 
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Nevertheless, the authors did ultimately conclude that 
discounting, more or less as usual, should be applied in 
calculating the social cost of carbon, and they did so apparently 
for no reason other than consistency with the standard 
contemporary theoretical foundations of benefit-cost analysis.93 
The particulars of the discounting debate have been reviewed at 
length elsewhere and will not be recounted here.94 For present 
purposes, it is enough to note that in the climate change context, 
whether and how to discount exerts such enormous influence on 
policy recommendations that one wonders whether Livermore 
and Revesz are correct that proponents of environmental policies 
are best advised to play within the confines of costbenefit 
analysis, rather than try to engage societal discussion regarding 
the underlying issues of generational responsibility that even 
economists now acknowledge cannot be resolved by costbenefit 
analysis. Discounting is a crude and misleading way to 
incorporate matters of intergenerational ethics and distributive 
equity into the welfare-maximization exercise. If OIRA and the 
agencies insist that climate change policies must be evaluated 
using discounting, then costbenefit analysis should be 
undertaken with the aid of shadow markets, in which natural 
resources and other environmental goods are first endowed to 
future generations through sustainability constraints or other 
                                                     
 93. Id. at 19 (explaining why a descriptive approach to selecting the discount rate 
was chosen over a prescriptive approach). 
 94. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV 119, 
120, 138 (2007) (recognizing that discounting is most controversial when applied to 
human lives and also problematic when applied to ordinary resources). Dean Revesz 
has been a leading participant in these discussions. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, CostBenefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 998 (1999) (dismissing possible justifications for discounting for 
time preference at a positive rate as not compelling). For his latest contribution, see 
Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations 
(Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-59, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666423, which discusses the flaws in current 
approaches to discounting benefits that accrue to future generations. It is worthwhile to 
note here that the task force did not consider evidence of declining discount rates through 
which individuals express increasing regard for future generations over time, a social 
science finding that Cass Sunstein has called so important that an agency that does not 
consider it should be legally vulnerable on the grounds that it has acted arbitrarily. Id. 
at 67 (quoting David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the 
Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POLY REV. 433, 44344 (2009)). Martin 
Weitzman also has defended hyperbolic discounting on the ground that uncertainty over 
the appropriate discount rate should favor lower rates in order to avoid the undue 
dominance by higher rates that would follow if discount rates are turned into discount 
factors over a time series and averaged together. Id. at 19 (citing Martin L. Weitzman, 
Gamma Discounting, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260 (2001); Martin L. Weitzman, Just Keep 
Discounting, But . . . , in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 23 (Paul R. 
Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999); Weitzman, supra note 82). 
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regulatory measures.95 Modeling a sustainable market economy 
in this way will generate a hypothetical interest rate that 
regulatory analysts might then use to discount future costs and 
benefits when evaluating policies. Significant intergenerational 
policy issues like climate change regulation will look 
dramatically different when evaluated in this way. If we first 
endow future generations with the right to a relatively safe and 
stable concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphereas 
physical scientists implicitly urge when they propose maximum 
climate change thresholds such as a 2oC temperature increase over 
pre-Industrial levels or a 350 parts per million carbon dioxide 
concentration limitthen the present generation would be 
required to purchase those rights from future generations using 
prices that reflect a normatively defensible background allocation 
of atmospheric rights. As it is, conventional costbenefit analysis 
proceeds as if the present generation owns everything, implicitly 
answering with neither analysis nor defense a question that 
lies at the very core of the climate change policy problem. 
Importantly, this question cannot be avoided even if one 
adopts the mainstream welfare economic view that future 
generations can be compensated through undifferentiated 
accumulation of capital whenever specific natural resources 
are compromisedeven ones as basic and seemingly 
nonsubstitutable as atmospheric stability. Even on this bullish 
view, the level of compensation that is due to future generations 
must be calculated in a way that first asks who owns the resources 
that have been destroyed. Any other procedure allows the present 
generation to play lord in a game of temporal feudalism. 
IV. LOST IN TRANSLATION 
One way of understanding regulatory impact analysis is as 
an instrument for exercising centralized executive control over a 
vast federal administrative state, even occasionally against the 
wishes of the Congress that creates, funds, and instructs the 
relevant agencies.96 On this account, the continuity of federal 
                                                     
 95. Cf. Joshua Farley, The Role of Prices in Conserving Critical Natural Capital, 22 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1399, 1406 (2008) (arguing that climate conservation should be 
market-determining, not market-determined). 
 96. In this respect, Livermore and Revesz may understate the impact of changes to 
regulatory oversight adopted during the George W. Bush Administration, which they 
describe as relatively minor changes. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 7, 15. Those 
reforms, which were nominally rescinded by the Obama Administration, would have 
subjected all federal agency guidance documents to OIRA oversight and would have 
appointed a White House policy officer within each agency to ensure that costbenefit 
analysis was applied earlier in the rulemaking process than currently practiced, irrespective 
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costbenefit practice over the last several administrations would 
say less about a genuine bipartisan embrace of the methodology 
than it does about the consistency of presidential interest in 
consolidating administrative authority and expanding White 
House policy influence. Partly in response to this view, many 
costbenefit reformersLivermore and Revesz chief among 
themhave called for greater disclosure and transparency in the 
regulatory oversight process.97 The OMB under President Obama 
claims to agree,98 and indeed Livermore and Revesz in their 
address applaud OMB and OIRA for the widespread public 
participation that occurred during the review process for a 
possible new executive order on regulatory review.99 The authors 
fail to note, however, that the Obama Administration initially 
indicated no such interest in public input for the executive order 
review and only opened the process to comment after pressure 
from nongovernmental organizations like the Center for 
Progressive Reform.100 Similarly, the role of OIRA in diluting the 
EPAs rulemaking on coal ash only came to light after the EPA 
inadvertently (or perhaps with apparent inadvertence) released 
OIRAs markup on the agencys website.101 In point of fact, OIRA 
operates with remarkably little accountability: no congressional 
committee or subcommittee exercises direct oversight, and no 
citizen suit provision ensures an opportunity for judicial review 
of OIRA decisions.102 The Obama Administration has done little 
                                                     
of whether the statutes being implemented called foror even permittedcostbenefit 
analysis. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33862, CHANGES TO THE OMB 
REGULATORY REVIEW PROCESS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13422, at 512 (2007). 
 97. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 17172. 
 98. See 2009 OMB REPORT, supra note 21, at 43 ([C]areful regulatory analysis, if 
transparent in its assumptions and subject to public scrutiny, should be seen as part and 
parcel of open government.). 
 99. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1314. 
 100. See Letter from Rena Steinzor, President, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, to Peter 
Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Feb. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/PreliminaryCommentsonNewEO-Orszag.pdf. 
Compare Obama Memorandum, supra note 10 (directing OIRA to encourage public 
participation), with Federal Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819, 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009) 
(Executive Orders are not subject to notice and comment procedures, and as a general 
rule, public comment is not formally sought before they are issued. In this case, however, 
there has been an unusually high level of public interest, and because of the evident 
importance and fundamental nature of the relevant issues, the Director of OMB invites 
public comments on the principles and procedures governing regulatory review.). 
 101. See Document DetailsDoc. ID: EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0350, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009- 
0640-0350 (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) (This document was posted on this public site in 
error by EPA.); see also Interagency Working Comments, supra note 49 (open document 
by clicking on the PDF icon). 
 102. See Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1263, 130910 (2006) 
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to alter this basic problematic dynamic. Nor has the 
administration seemed particularly enthusiastic about stemming 
the trend toward greater and greater presidential 
administration.103 For instance, at least in the context of EPAs 
effort to provide guidance on dioxin, OIRA has continued to 
follow a Bush Administration executive order subjecting agency 
guidance documents to OIRA review, even though the Obama 
Administration purported to rescind that order.104 
The democracy-enhancing potential of regulatory impact 
analysis is easy to state but difficult to observe. Invariably, 
costbenefit analyses of proposed regulations are dense, jargony, 
and opaque; inevitably, they contain moments deep within their 
technical details in which the analyst masks a critical value 
choice through a methodological maneuver.105 Perhaps if the 
foundational value questions at the heart of costbenefit analysis 
were opened up for democratic negotiationsuch as the debate 
over willingness-to-pay as the default value metric or the best 
way to consider the rights of future generationsthen the public 
could start playing a more active role. But those questions are 
typically treated by costbenefit proponents as matters of elite 
expertise or disciplinary orthodoxy, rather than debatable moral 
and political issues. As a result, the prevailing assumptions and 
principles of costbenefit analysis are rarely subjected to 
transparent and sustained critique, even though they often work 
to stack the deck against aggressive regulatory action on behalf 
of environmental, health, and safety protection. Even the 
interagency task force on the social cost of carbon, which in many 
respects was a model of open and self-critical disciplinary 
examination, nevertheless balked at key moments in its analysis 
just as foundational questions were coming into view, the 
answers to which might well have justified far greater levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation.106 
                                                     
(discussing concerns that OIRAs regulatory review process lacks transparency and 
congressional oversight). 
 103. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2281−2319 (2001) (describing the evolution and growth of presidential administration 
during the Clinton Administration). 
 104. CPRs Eye on OIRA, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, 
http://www.progressivereform.org/eyeonoira.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 105. For a detailed case study involving OIRAs successful effort to force EPA to 
dilute Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, see Douglas A. Kysar, Fish Tales, in 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN 
ADVOCATES AND SKEPTICS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 190 (Winston Harrington et al. 
eds., 2009). 
 106. For instance, the task force admirably refused to limit its analysis of climate 
change impacts to the United States alone, instead calculating both a domestic and global 
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Livermore and Revesz argue that this antiregulatory bias 
associated with costbenefit analysis and OIRA review is a 
mirage.107 But the examples they highlight of how political 
actors and citizens groups can [p]romot[e] an [a]ggressive 
[r]egulatory [a]genda with [c]ost[b]enefit [a]nalysis fall short of 
proving this case.108 The authors begin by noting that the Obama 
Administration has used costbenefit analysis to publicly defend 
some of its regulatory initiatives, including implementation of 
the Clean Air Act with respect to greenhouse gas emissions.109 
This observation tells us little about what factors drove the 
President in some contexts to use costbenefit analysis to support 
agency proposals (e.g., automobile fuel efficiency standards) but 
in others to use the same methodology to attack them (e.g., coal 
ash disposal). Moreover, the agency actions cited by Livermore 
and Revesz were in almost all cases driven by statutory 
provisions that require health-based, technology-based, or other 
non-costbenefit-based standards for implementation. Nor do 
the examples offered by Livermore and Revesz of how 
protection-oriented groups are more effectively using costbenefit 
analysis undermine the long-standing association of costbenefit 
analysis with a deregulatory agenda. The first two examplesof 
reproductive rights groups arguing against the Church 
Amendment and of the National Wildlife Federation opposing 
government subsidies for flood insuranceshow progressive 
organizations successfully using costbenefit analysis to criticize 
existing or proposed regulations, not to propose and defend new 
ones.110 The third exampleof various groups using costbenefit 
measures to redirect criminal justice spendingsupports the 
                                                     
social cost of carbon (albeit one in which extraterritorial impacts were valued in a way 
that may have severely underestimated their actual welfare significance). See TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 10 (As a matter of law, consideration of both global and 
domestic values is generally permissible . . . .). The task forces reasoning for considering 
the matter in question, however, was odd. The task force observed that federal statutes 
are presumed not to have extraterritorial effect, in part to ensure that the laws of the 
United States respect the interests of foreign sovereigns. Id. at 10 n.6. A presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws does in fact respect the sovereign 
authority of foreign nations. But a presumption that U.S. laws have no extraterritorial 
impact would do exactly the opposite: it would treat all extraterritorial consequences of 
U.S. laws and activities as unpriced externalities, making the world into the United 
States waste bin, which is hardly a measure of respect. Whether to apply U.S. law to 
extraterritorial conduct is an entirely separate question from whether to consider 
extraterritorial impacts when fashioning the content of U.S. law and policy. That the task 
force felt required to defend its consideration of the latter reveals how far a default 
position of insularity and isolationism has overtaken U.S. politics. 
 107. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 27. 
 108. Id. at 27. 
 109. Id. at 2729. 
 110. Id. at 2932. 
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idea that regulatory impact analysis can help rationalize, 
i.e., shrink, an existing area of government expenditure, not 
that it can justify greater levels or new areas of expenditure.111 
The fourth exampleof mainstream environmental 
organizations commenting on the interagency social cost of 
carbon exerciseshows only increasing engagement by advocacy 
groups with the costbenefit methodology, not that the 
methodology has led to demonstrated improvements in 
environmental, health, and safety regulation.112 For reasons 
discussed in Part II, the social cost of carbon is likely to confuse 
and weaken the climate change policy agenda, rather than to 
strengthen it. 
Indeed, early experience with the social cost of carbon 
suggests that it has not altered the political dynamics of 
regulatory costbenefit analysis. Most notably, the EPA and 
NHTSA recently proposed the first ever U.S. standards for fuel 
efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions for heavy-duty trucks 
and buses.113 Overall, the agencies estimate that the program will 
provide $41 billion in net benefits over the lifetime of model year 
2014 to 2018 vehicles, an astonishing amount that was driven in 
part by climate change benefits (valued using a social cost of 
carbon set at $22 per ton and discounted at 3%), but primarily 
by cost savings to truckers from lower fuel expenditures.114 
Given this remarkable level of low-hanging fruit from fuel 
savings aloneand given the fact that the agencies did not 
quantify any of the long list of non-greenhouse gas 
environmental and human health benefits associated with 
reducing heavy truck emissionsone might strongly suspect 
that the proposed standard is inefficiently low. Indeed, the 
National Research Council report mandated by Congress to guide 
agency decisionmaking in this area recommended stronger 
standards than those proposed by EPA and NHTSA,115 and 
administration officials conceded that the proposed standards are 
                                                     
 111. Id. at 32. 
 112. Id. at 33. 
 113. COMM. TO ASSESS FUEL ECON. TECHS. FOR MEDIUM- AND HEAVY-DUTY 
VEHICLES, NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE 
FUEL CONSUMPTION OF MEDIUM- AND HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLES 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12845.html [hereinafter COMM. TO ASSESS FUEL ECONOMY]; 
see also Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 108, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1505. 
 114. OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, EPA & NHTSA, EPA AND NHTSA PROPOSE 
FIRST-EVER PROGRAM TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND IMPROVE FUEL 
EFFICIENCY OF MEDIUM-AND HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLES: REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT 2, 3 
& n.4 (2010). 
 115. COMM. TO ASSESS FUEL ECONOMY, supra note 113, at 5−8, 39. 
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significantly less ambitious than recommended in order to 
keep costs manageable.116 Moreover, this determination appears 
to have been made after extensive consultation with 
manufacturers and trucking companies and a detailed review by 
the White House Office of Management and Budget.117 
Considering the enormous monetary values generally associated 
with reducing ambient ozone, particulate matter, and air toxics, 
and the fact that [r]esource and time constraints precluded the 
[EPA] from completing [quantification of these benefits] in time 
for the proposal,118 one might have expected OMB to nudge the 
agencies in a different direction than it apparently did. 
Livermore and Revesz are undoubtedly correct that  
costbenefit analysis is likely to be a fixture of the regulatory 
state for years to come and that at least some segments of the 
environmental, health, and safety advocacy community ought to 
get good at using it so that antiregulatory forces do not exert 
monopoly power over its principles and assumptions. But, at the 
same time, alternative languages for identifying and urging 
progressive goals should not be abandoned entirely as their 
translation into the costbenefit vernacular will be rough and 
potentially counterproductive. Consider an example from Adam 
Finkel, one of costbenefit analysiss most thoughtful proponents, 
who recently suggested that progressive supporters of same-sex 
marriage would do better to rest their case on costbenefit 
analysis than on equality-based moral reasoning that might 
appear to be easily stalemated by arguments from religion, 
natural law, and other such comprehensive moral schemes. On 
the costbenefit account, readily monetizable benefits to the 
wedding industry alone would seem to carry the day in favor of 
legalizing same-sex marriage, easily trumping whatever amount 
of intangible disutility could be adequately demonstrated, 
quantified, and monetized by those individuals and groups who 
stand opposed to same-sex marriage.119 Finkels example follows a 
longstanding but underappreciated strand of the utilitarian 
tradition: one of utilitarianisms most elegant defenses has been 
that the theory is best used not as an all-encompassing program 
for individual or collective action but instead as a heuristic device 
                                                     
 116. Broder, supra note 114. 
 117. Id. 
 118. EPA, DRAFT REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO 
ESTABLISH GREEN-HOUSE GAS EMISSIONS STANDARDS AND FUEL EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 
FOR MEDIUM- AND HEAVY-DUTY ENGINES AND VEHICLES 838 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420d10901.pdf. 
 119. Adam Finkel, Book Review, 53 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 101, 102 (2011) 
(reviewing KYSAR, supra note 96). 
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to uncover neglect, marginalization, and oppression within a 
given social order.120 Bentham and Mill, after all, are well 
remembered not only for their theoretical contributions but also 
for their early and prescient championing of equal rights for 
women, emancipation of slaves, and legal protection of 
nonhuman animals.121 By narrowing the pertinent question to a 
seemingly narrow and objective onefor example, as Bentham 
asked of animals, Can they suffer?the utilitarian approach 
rules out a range of arguments that might otherwise seem to 
justify a rigid and unjust status quo.122 
Nevertheless, this progressive tilt to utilitarianism is 
actually only half of a seesaw, for it is always possible that the 
empirics might come out differently than progressive proponents 
urge. Bentham and his latter-day followers like Peter Singer may 
be right that animals can suffer and that this fact alone justifies 
the moral considerability of animals,123 but a full utilitarian logic 
requires balancing whatever animal disutility has been 
demonstrated against the utility generated (for humans) by 
factory farming, medical experimentation, habitat destruction, 
and other activities through which animals suffer and perish. As 
Part II suggests, these calculative exercises do not depend 
ultimately on rigid empirical facts, but rather on contestable 
features of the epistemic practices by which facts are thought to 
be discovered and valued. Thus, to return to Finkels example, the 
apparent desirability of same-sex marriage under costbenefit 
analysis does not represent some fixed truth about the physics of 
                                                     
 120. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND 
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 122 (2010) (describing the value of utilitarianism as a potency 
to lay bare injustice). 
 121. See LEA CAMPOS BORALEVI, BENTHAM AND THE OPPRESSED 536, 144 (1984) 
(analyzing Benthams contribution to feminism and comparing his views regarding 
oppression of women and slaves); JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 2829 
(London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1896) (arguing against presumptions that 
place women in social and political subjection to men); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 
in JUSTICE: A READER 14, 37 (2007) (Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted 
that the rights of the slave, such as they are, ought to be as sacred as those of the 
master . . . .); Gary L. Francione, AnimalsProperty or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS 108, 
113 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (attributing Bentham with the 
origination of humane animal treatment principles); Gary L. Francione & Anna E. 
Charlton, Abolitionist Approach to Animal Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 
AND ANIMAL WELFARE (Marc Bekoff ed., 2d ed. 2010) (Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill argued that animals deserved to be included in the moral community and given at 
least some legal protection . . . .). 
 122. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 310 n.1 (Hafner Publg Co. 1948) (1781). 
 123. See Peter Singer, All Animals Are Equal, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN 
OBLIGATIONS 148, 15254 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976) (arguing that utilitarian 
principles support advocating for equal rights for animals). 
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welfare, but rather only the contingent outcome of a socio-political 
battle to generate authoritative constructs of welfare. Victory 
on such a plane is necessarily shallow: even if the empirics never 
changethat is, even if opponents of same-sex marriage never 
succeed in constructing an alternative welfare exercise under 
which their disutility swamps the demonstrated benefits of equal 
marriage opportunitythose who support same-sex marriage 
will have not achieved the victory they seek. The true goal of 
same-sex marriage proponents is equal recognition and respect 
for same-sex marriage partners, something that cannot 
adequately be captured or justified by a happenstance and 
always revisable calculation of welfare. 
To switch the examples political valence but maintain its 
analysis intact, it is not all that strange, as Livermore and 
Revesz suggest, that Sunsteins nomination as the head of ORIA 
got held up on the issue of animal rights and his support for gun 
control measures.124 As Dan Kahan and Donald Braman have 
persuasively shown, political debates about gun control have very 
little to do with the empirical consequences of gun control 
measures and much to do with whether those measures affirm or 
discredit individuals cultural worldviews.125 Because he is a 
thoroughgoing welfarist, Sunstein came rather smoothly to the 
conclusion that animals might count for public policy purposes 
and that their suffering might justify some form of legal 
restriction on hunting and other harmful activities. But gun 
rights advocates think through different concepts than these and 
no a priori reason exists for believing that their thinking is 
inferior to welfarists. Indeed, the objection of gun rights 
advocates to Sunsteins nomination was not altogether different 
from that of environmentalists: both groups seek the 
instantiation into law of values and principles that they regard 
as inviolable.126 Sunstein, instead, has come to stand for the 
position that everything is violable, for violability is the 
intellectual core of the welfaristutilitarian reasoning that he 
has promoted. Indeed, much about American politics is revealed 
                                                     
 124. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1617; Peter Nicholas, More than 
Healthcare Rides on Obamas Speech; His Address Is Meant to Revive Reform Efforts, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A1. 
 125. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A 
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1295−1301 (2003) 
(presenting evidence that views on gun control are shaped by cultural orientation rather 
than empirical data). 
 126. See id. at 12991301 (arguing that gun control activists are more concerned 
with projecting their values and principles into law than making policy based on 
empirical data). 
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by the fact that Sunsteins welfarism alienated both those who 
seek unchecked freedom in human weaponry and those who seek 
responsible liberation in nonhuman care. If politics makes 
strange bedfellows, it also makes strange common enemies. 
A similar analysis applies to Livermore and Reveszs 
discussion of the Church Amendment and the scholars effort to 
assist reproductive rights advocates in demonstrating the welfare 
consequences of restricting the availability of abortion 
procedures.127 If welfarism prevails as the determinant of public 
policy, such restrictions on abortion procedures might well be 
overturned. But this result will not have answered the objections 
of abortion opponents on their own terms. Specifically, it will not 
have resolved whether a life conceived is a life with moral and 
political considerability that definitively outweighs the liberty 
interests of its mother (and, to a lesser but not unreal extent, its 
father). Any thoroughgoing costbenefit analysis of the Church 
Amendment would have to make some determination about 
whether to count the utility lost by those individuals who never 
come to be due to wider availability of abortion procedures. 
Through this determination, the ultimate moral question raised 
by abortion would be implicitly answered, but in a way that 
neither side of the abortion debate is likely to find adequately 
expressive of their views. The basic mistake here lies in thinking 
that there can be a universally agreeable secular-liberal 
welfarism, toward which we might nudge our political agents 
and underneath which their principals might submit. Any such 
welfarism would remain inherently and perpetually contestable. 
Most basically, as just noted, such a welfarism must establish 
who counts for purposes of welfare calculation: Only presently 
living American citizens (or also lawful residentsor even 
undocumented residentsliving in America)? What about 
individuals living in other nations? What about nonhuman 
animals, wherever they live? What about the conceived unborn, 
i.e., those lives in being/becoming that have dominated American 
politics for decades without any resolution as to who/what they 
are? What about the unconceived unborn, i.e., those future 
generations who figure prominently in the politics of the same 
environmentalists who generally oppose abortion restrictions, 
but who lack an adequate account of why they appear to care 
more for the unconceived unborn than the conceived? 
Even if these vexing questions were somehow resolved, one 
still must establish methods for valuing welfare consequences to 
                                                     
 127. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 1, at 2931. 
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the acknowledged beneficiaries of costbenefit analysis, as well as 
weights for adjusting those consequences in light of the diverse 
socioeconomic, geographic, and temporal positions that the 
acknowledged beneficiaries will occupy. In this respect, if we 
continue to force costbenefit analysis on agencies, then we should 
also force them to use multiple alternative measures of welfare. 
Present practice dictates that only one value metricusually 
willingness-to-payis used to determine the monetary worth of 
policy consequences. This approach has a dramatically 
conservative effect. It essentially privileges the status quo 
distribution of rights and resources, so that any policy other than 
a minor nudge from existing patterns appears to have a large 
efficiency cost that must be justified by even greater benefits. 
Our problems demand a greater degree of ethical imagination 
than this. Just as OMB bravely acknowledged with respect to 
GDP on the macroeconomic level,128 it should acknowledge on the 
microeconomic level that a single conception of value such as 
willingness-to-pay will never be adequate for our needs. 
Irrespective of which metric we choose to ground welfare 
analysis, the danger arises that it will come to crowd out other 
ways of conceptualizing well-being and promoting its attainment; 
significant questions will become effectively embargoed because 
the optimizing logic of costbenefit analysis will attach an 
efficiency cost to any deviation from its norms of evaluation. By 
requiring agencies instead to present costbenefit data using 
alternative value metrics, we might prompt serious discussion 
regarding the merits of competing welfare criteria. Cost and 
benefit data might then become denaturalized, especially as they 
pertain to the existing pattern of right and resource distribution. 
At one point in its report, the task force on the social cost of 
carbon valiantly acknowledged that diminishing marginal utility 
of income is a safe assumption, such that the calculation of 
welfare should not be based on measures such as GDP per capita 
that are parasitic on the existing distribution of wealth.129 But the 
task force oddly declined to adopt that assumption out of 
deference to the ideological presuppositions of the current state 
of the economics discipline, which prefers to value using metrics 
that privilege the status quo distribution of wealth and power in 
society and across the globe, while relegating redistribution to 
                                                     
 128. OMBs 2009 report to Congress noted that the prevailing macroeconomic 
measure of national welfare (GDP)often taken as the very raison dêtre of the 
nation-stateis hardly our only or even our most important measure of collective 
progress. 2009 OMB REPORT, supra note 21, at 29. 
 129. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 11. 
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the category of equity as opposed to efficiency.130 A more honest 
debate over welfare economics and costbenefit analysis would 
recognize that the choice of value metric is an ultimate moral and 
political choice. It is a choice that will itself determine what 
counts as efficient, maximizing, optimal, and all other 
presumptively good things versus what will count as 
redistribution, altruism, charity, and all other 
presumptively optional things. To lose this choice is to start the 
game with an enormous handicap, and that explains to a great 
extent why proponents of environmental, health, and safety 
regulation have been reluctant to heed Livermore and Reveszs 
advice to join the effort. The game as currently played is rigged 
against them and submitting to its ground rules might seem to 
endorse those rules as somehow justified. If value metrics other 
than GDP and willingness-to-pay predominated within the 
welfare economics profession, then the interests that would 
benefit from such an alternative metric would come a-calling, no 
doubt. Until such a transformation occurs, however, 
environmental, health, and safety proponents may be forgiven for 
questioning whether it really is better to play costbenefit 
analysis rather than to attack its foundations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The very title, Retaking Rationality, suggests a battlefield to 
be regained through power, rather than a scientific or academic 
effort to forge consensus through reason and empiricism. One 
suspects, then, that Livermore and Revesz are aware that 
regulatory costbenefit analysis may only represent lobbying in a 
different, more specialized vernacular: politics by other 
meanings. Nevertheless, assuming Livermore and Revesz are 
correct that costbenefit analysis is here to stayand this 
Author has no reason to doubt their predictionthen 
proponents of environmental, health, and safety regulation 
would do well to start talking the talk as best they can. What 
they should not do, however, is convince themselves that the 
translation of their goals and values into costbenefit terms will 
be lossless. Costbenefit analysis is a language spoken by few 
and dominated by even fewer. Its diction is poor though it 
                                                     
 130. See id. at 11 (Notwithstanding the theoretical claims on behalf of equity 
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purports to speak everything meaningful. At least some, then, 
should follow Solzhenitsyns advice: Let [the lie] come into the 
world and even reign over it, but not through me.131 
                                                     
 131. ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, NOBEL LECTURE 33 (F.D. Reeve trans., 1972). 
